How ´latin´is Latin America?
Roberto Romano
Revista Art-Press 249, septembre 1999
How ´latin´is Latin America?
Roberto Romano
Applied to the vast geographical zone that stretches from Mexico to
the Caribbean and from there all the way to the south, “Latin America”
is what Émile Benveniste called a “starter” term. We have plenty of
evidence that the “Latinity” of South America is far from obvious and
that the term is misleading as regards discourse, economics, politics,
art and religion: yet, whenever a writer —even a South American— is
stuck for a way of describing the continent´s cultural fabric, out comes
that word ´Latin`, allowing him to start his argument.
Authors who have taken on the thankless task of studying the
“Latinity” of America tend to begin in the 19th century with
intra-European feuding and the rivalry between Europe and the emerging
U.S. Artur Ardao cites Michel Chevalier, a French Saint-Simonian whose
depiction of America cultures, published in 1836, drew on old ideas
concerning hypothetical “Saxon”, “Germanic”, “Latin” or “Slav”
identities. He declared that North America was Protestant and
Anglo-Saxon, while the South was Catholic and Latin. (1) But here we
need to consider the broader context, beyond the social utopias and
doctrines formulated in the “Age of Prophets”. ( 2)
The term “Latin America” originated in French foreign policy and,
more particularly, in Napoleon III´s attempts to gain a firm foot-hold
in the Americas. For the Emperor, it was vital that the U.S. should not
take control of Mexico, since it would make them dominant all the way to
the West Indies and South America. “If”, Napoleon wrote to General
Forey, “Mexico retains her independence and territorial integrity, and
if, with the support of France, a stable governement can be established
there, we will have restored its strenght and prestige to the Latin race
on the ´other´ side of the Ocean […] it is our duty to intervene in
Mexico and to raise our flag there”. ( 3) Analysts of Hispanic South
America also signal the attempt to use French culture in the
intellectual movements working for the modernization of society and the
state, with a view to reducing the Spanish influence. In the case of
Brazil, we should not forget that when Dom João fled there as Napoleon I
´s army advanced into Portugal, he was followed by a wave of French
influences whose impact on Brazilian culture was felt all the way
through to the 20th century.
In Search of the ideal colonist
It is important to realize that the name “Latin America” was the
fruit of political, economic, strategic, ideological and even religious
conflicts involving Europe, the U.S. and South America itself. The word
“Latin” does not refer to a common culture inherited from “Latium” via
Spain and Portugal, but was an invention designed to bring out the
strategic difference of the southern continent with regard to the
northern one. While North Americans were said to be Protestant
capitalists, materialist believers in the market, South Americans, like
the French, were seen as upholders of cultural and spirituals values.
South Americans governments have played on this uncertanty ever since :
should they assert their affinity with the political, doctrinaire and
artistic forms and culture of France, or welcome U.S. hegemony ? The
Organization of America States, a product of North American dominance,
has always been handicapped by this dilemma: even today, its members
still havent´t made up their minds as to wether it is better to accept
U.S. dominance or to seek cooperation with France, which epitomizes
“Latinity”. It was a similar uncertainty that underlay the debates as to
the kind of immigration that would be strategically most appropriate
for the new nations.
Thus, in the 19th century, discussions concerning the kind of
workforce that would best replace the slaves unfailingly referred to
ideas about the “hardworking and disciplined” character of certain
nations. Italy, France and Germany were perceived as models. Hence the
large numbers of Italian and German immigrants in Brazil. The French
influx was limited to the major towns and to highly qualified sectors
from the arts to engineering, from agronomy or urbanism and military
planning.
Thus, the recipe for ideal colonization propounded by various social
doctrines at the turn of the 20th century brought together cultures that
were not only in conflict but would soon the fighting each other to the
death in two world wars.
In Brazil, the issue of the “ideal immigrant” was hotly debated from
Empire to Republic. The positivists, purported upholders of French
culture, were divided: some called for German, others for French. Miguel
Lemos, the head of the Positivist Church, represented the latter
position, while the former was embodied by Luis Pereira Barreto, leader
of the unorthodox positivists. Lemos claimed that “Barreto´s ideal is
Germanization of Brazil, and so he extols the ´noble German race´.
Barreto countered this accusation of Germanophilia with demographic
arguments: “if I have not recommended French immigration, it is only for
reasons of common sense. I know that France does not have enough
inhabitants even for her needs […] and it would be the height of folly
to ask her to depopulate in order to come and populate Brazil. The most
rudimentary knowledge of demography rules this out: it is well known tha
the populations of Prussia and England will double over next 45 years,
whereas it will take France 198 years to double its own (Bertillon)”.
(4) Like many others, Barreto sought a way of setting the huge Brazilian
territory with productive immigrants who would be able to break with
the “backward” models of the earlier Iberian colonists.
While the ideological debate raged on, politicians pursued
“practical” ways of replacing the African slaves who had sustained the
country´s economic activity for hundreds of years. Thus the first
liberal government made plans to import Chineses laborers, who were
reputed to be “an excellent working tool”. While the positivists
objected, their humanitarian approach was very much the exception. With
their hegemonic position in world coffee production and trade, liberals
took a pragmatict approach, seeking immigrants who would increase
productivity and agricultural expertise while offering “innate” honesty
and discipline. This idealized “good immigrant” —the mirror image of
Rousseau´s “noble savage”— was, they argued, the only way of overcoming
the handicaps afflicting large numbers of the poor, including the
“desorganized and lazy” peasant farmers, the “savage and violent”
natives and, last but not least, the Africans, that “impure and
redoutable horde of the two million blacks, suddenly gifted with
constitutional prerogatives”. Described by some prominent liberals as
the “this African toxin”, blacks were perceived as threatening “the
physical unity of the Nation itself, abasing the nationality level in
proportion to their prominence in the mixture” (5) For such liberals it
mattered little whether immigrants were Latins or Teutons: they could be
anything provided they were not African, not part of the “toxin”
threatening to cripple economic and social depelopment.
Thus, in accordance with this policy of substitution, governments
from the Empire period to the Republic attracted immigrants of nearly
every nationality. Today, in the State of São Paulo, not far from the
border with Paraná, the small town originally named Núcleo Colonial
Barão de Antonina remains a kind of Tropical Babel, with the descendents
of Russian, Japanese, Hungarian, German, Portuguese, Spanish, Polish
and many other nationalities all living side by side. The plan had been
to give these new arrivals and adaptation period to learn all about the
conditions of Brazil and the land that they would soon be farming. But
this was abandoned in favor of the direct implantation of the different
national groups in separate regions. The Núcleo is a monument, a unique
community where Russians would fraternize with Japanese and and all
would tend their garden in perfect, Candide-like harmony. (6)
Why do I insist on this aspect of Brazilian immigration ? Because it
played a crucial role in the “modernization” of the country´s economic
life, as indeed it did throughout south America. While the black labor
force was less prominent in Argentina and Chile, the political élites
there were just as anxious to find “industrious and disciplined”
immigrants to replace the “undesirable” Indians, the Spaniards, who were
reputedly averse to hard physical work, and other “backward” groups. In
the light of this doctrine, which prevailed in the late 19th and early
20th centuries, it seems more than a little dubious to describe South
American culture as “Latin”.
Thus, if we dig beneath the culturally homogenous topsoil of the
Spanish and Portuguese languages, we find a real diversity of cultures
and populations. We already know, of course, that North Americana has
its own “Latin” territory in Quebec, that English is spoken in the
Caribbean and that at least two Guianas are not “Latin”. To this can be
added the Germanic population in the State of Espirito Santo, which is
of Pomeranian origin. São Paulo too has a sizeable German colony,
complete with Jewish communities that have sustained a Yiddish culture.
Throughout the country one can find inhabitants of Arab origin, mainly
Lebanese or Syrians, plus Turks and Armenians. In Paraná State, there
are large Japanese, German, Polish, Hungarian, Ukrainian and Russian
colonies. In the State of Santa Catarina you will find Germans, poles as
well as Portuguese from the Azores, which has a different culture from
the Portuguese mainland. There are large German and Italian contingents
in Rio Grande do Sul.
Thix mix of nationalities proved highly uncomfortable for the
dictator Getúlio Vargas, both before, during and after World War II. In
the face of the Nazi thread, and the risk that the German and other
populations might break away, his government took a number of extreme
measures. A ban on vernacular languages in schools and public places was
consolidated by an aggressive propaganda campaign in favor of
“Brazilianness”, a fictional construct in which cultural, political,
religious and racial conflicts were dissolved into a homogeneous value
system founded on a mythical “racial democracy”. The reality is that all
these cultures and nationalities created and continue to create their
own distinct political, artistic and religious forms which are a long
away from this notional “Brazilian culture”. If we look at those States
without prominent Slavic or German groups, we find another negation of
the country´s supposed “Latinity” : African influences. These are
specially strong in Bahia´s markedly islamic religion and culture. In
Pernambuco, Paraiba and other north-eastern states, vestiges of dutch
culture can be detected in among the Portuguese, while the region´s
intellectual history has been marked by a German influence which is
perceptible even today.
The German cultural heritage is particularly strong in Chile,
especially in the army. There is also an obvious German presence in
Paraguay and Peru, which has a prominent Japanese community. The
Anglophilia of the Argentinean upper classes has become something of a
joke to their neighbors, while powerful movements in Chile and even
Brazil have tried to strenghthen the German cultural and economic
presence in these countries. (7) A similar phenomenon has occurred in
Uruguay. In contrast, countries to the north, such as Venezuela, have
assimalet North American cultural models more throughly than their
neighbors.
It is undeniable that French culture has had a decisive influence on
the official and unofficial culture of many countries. This was the case
in Brazil, from the Empire periodo through to World War I, when the
arts, politics, economics, science and even the military were indebt to
Gallic models and products. Only after World War II did the army begin
to model its techniques and strategies on those of the United States. In
recent decades howeverm Brazilian interest in French culture has waned
somewahat, largerly through fault of the French government itself, which
has failed to maintain its connection in the region. Among university
freshmen, those with a basica grasp of French are outnumbered by both
English and the German speakers.
From the above, it follows that while political considerations (and,
therefore, the concept of “Latinity”) will be central to South America´s
cultural self-definition and global positioning in the coming century,
it would be a mistake to overlook the minority cultural “pockets” that
are so much a part of the national fabric. Some of these communicate
with one another, others remain obstinately isolated. Nowadays it is not
so uncommun for former German colonies to attempt to forge new links
with the motherland. The same has happened with Italy, Spain, Portugal
and, to a lesser degree, France. Since it is possible to claim the
former nationality of one´s grandparents, many citizens are trying to
add an Asian or European nationality to their South one, while
developing their links with the linguistic, social, scientific and
cultural practices of the old country. This phenomenon is recent, but
developing fast. And while most grandchildren of European immigrants
(particularly those from Ukrainem Germany, Hungary, Poland and Russia)
studying in universities in the Brazilian Souths still don´t speak their
ancestral languages, European countries are trying to change this
situation.
Cultural Globalization
The “Latinity” of south America is thus a universal abstraction, an
increasingly square peg in the round hole of social, political and
economic reality —all the more so since the growing cultural influence
of the U.S. renders impossible the kind of “Latin hegemony” that could
be envisaged in the 19th and early 20th centuries. At a time when
adoption of the US dollar as the national currency is increasingly seen
as the only bulkwark against economic collapse, when cable TV and the
internet are the new and highly efficient agents of an imperial style
Pan-americanism. It is important to redefine the real meaning of this
“Latinity” which almost automatically disapears in the analysis of South
American cultural and social diversity.
Notes
(1) A. Ardao : Panamericanismo y Latinoamericanismo. America Latina en sus ideas. (Mexico City: Siglo Veintino Editores, 1986).
(2) Refer to Paul Benichou´s well-know analysis: Le Temps des
Prophètes. Doctrines de l´age romantique. (Paris, Gallimard, 1977).
(3) Letter dated july 3, 1862. Cf. M. Rojas, Los Cien Nombres de America. Eso que Descrubio Colón (Barcelona: Lumen, 1991).
(4) Cf. Ivan Lins, História do Positivismo no Brasil (São Paulo, CECEd. 1991).
(5) Julio de Mesquita Filho: A Crise nacional. Reflexões em torno de
uma data (São Paulo, Seção de Obras de O Estado de São Paulo, 1925). Cf.
Roberto Romano: Brasil, Igreja contra Estado (São Paulo, Kayrós Ed.
1979).
(6) More informations avaiables: http://www.baraodeantonina.sp.gov.br/historia.asp
(7) Brepohl de Magalhães, M.D. : “Os Pangermanistas Na Argentina, No
Brasil e No Chile.” In: E. G. Dayrell; Zilda Iokoi. (Org.). América
Latina Contemporânea: desafios e perspectivas (São Paulo, Ed. Expressão e
Cultura, 1996), páginas 212.
Roberto Romano
Translation from the French, C. Penwarden.
Translation from the French, C. Penwarden.
Roberto Romano teaches political philosophy at the Universidade
Estadual de Campinas. His publications include Lux in tenebris, Silence
et bruit and others books and articles.
